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A Negative Incentive Based Proposal for 
Campaign Finance Reform: Lessons 
From Nottingham 
herefore, upon such as come hereabouts, I levy a 
certain toll, which I use for a better purpose, I 
hope, than to make candlesticks wi thal .  
Therefore, sweet chuck, I would have thee deliver to me thy 
purse, that I may look into it, and judge, to the best of my 
poor powers, whether thou hast more wealth about thee 
than our law allows. ' 
Like the advent of taxes, summer re-runs, and visits from 
in-laws, 1992~ is here and another election year is upon us.3 
Elections, one of the enduring wonders of American 
democracy: provide each citizen a chance to participate in 
g~vernment.~ Elections are also a time when candidates are 
pounding the pavement searching for campaign dollars. After 
all, this is America, and Yand of the free" doesn't mean 
1. HOWARD PYLE, THE MERRY ADVENTURES OF ROBIN HOOD 101 (1952) (words 
of Robin Hood to Will Gamwell). 
2. I have never understood why we have elections in the "even" years-it 
seems to me that the "odd" years would make more sense. While I am on the 
subject, I have never understood why elections fall on the first Tuesday after the 
first Monday of November. Why not hold elections on a date with real meaning 
like July 4th' or better yet, April lst? 
3. You can always recognize an election year because it's the only time your 
Representative in Congress writes to you. 
4. It's a wonder that democracy can endure election year chaos. 
5 .  Yes, ours is a government "by the people and for the people," which has a 
nice ring to it until you have witnessed the spectacle of American politics. 
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candidates can get elected without some real financial backing. 
Today, serious candidates6 must raise staggering amounts of 
money to get elected.' During the 1988 campaign, amounts 
spent by political candidates in federal elections totaled $718 
m i l l i ~ n . ~  When expenditures by all political candidates and all 
who attempted to influence the political process at the federal, 
state, and local levels are summed together, the total cost of 
the 1988 election cycle swells to $2.7 b i l l i ~ n . ~  So where does all 
this money go? My guess is that the money is spent on a 
barrage of thirty second commercials, special breakfasts, and 
luncheons aimed a t  convincing the voting public that the 
candidates need more money. This Comment takes the position 
that campaign costs threaten to spiral out of control unless 
each candidate can be lead to raise and spend less money. This 
Comment further proposes a campaign receipts tax that would 
encourage individual candidates to voluntarily control their 
campaign spending sprees. 
11. A GLANCE AT THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
The biggest problem with our current campaign finance 
systemlo is not that candidates need a lot of money to get 
6 .  "Serious candidate" is something of an oxymoron, not because candidates 
are not serious people, but because the public finds i t  difficult to take what they 
say seriously. 
7. Was that a government "by the people" or "buy the people?" 
8. DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: 
CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 28-33 (1990). It is interesting to note 
that in 1988, winning House candidates spent an average of $388,000 and 
successful Senate candidates spent an average of $3,745,000. Id. at 36. Extravagant 
campaigning is not new to American politics. In 1757, George Washington was 
criticized for spending too much money in his campaign for the Virginia House of 
Burgesses. According to his critics, Washington passed out twenty-eight gallons of 
rum, fifty gallons of rum punch, thirty-four gallons of wine, forty-six gallons of 
beer and two gallons of cider royal. Considering that only 391 voters resided in the 
district, this amounted to over a quart-and-a half of liquor per voter. Alan Skelly, 
Note, Political Action Committees and the Supreme Court, 12 W. ST. U.L. REV. 281, 
281 (1984) (citing J. HARRIGAN, POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 213 (1984)). 
9. HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & MONICA BAUER, FINANCING THE 1988 ELECTION 
1 (1991). At this point it is both interesting and customary to consider how many 
miles 2.7 billion dollar bills placed end to end would extend. Considering that a 
dollar bill is 6 inches in length, simple mathematics reveal that 2.7 billion dollars 
multiplied by 6 inches per dollar divided by 12 inches times the reciprocal of 5,280 
feet per mile yields 255,682 miles. This mileage could span the entire distance 
from the earth to the moon or could be wrapped around the earth's equator ten 
times. Oddly, however, the mileage only accounts for one-half of one percent of 
John Sununu's frequent flyer miles. 
10. Of course, if American "'[flinance [is] the art of passing currency from hand 
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elected" but that each year they need more and more money 
to get elected.12 From 1972 t o  1988, for example, Senate 
campaign spending increased over 600 percent while House 
campaign spending increased over 456 percent.13 As a result, 
this rate of spending increase has some candidates 
worried--especially those who aren't very good at raising 
money. The natural question to ask at this point is, "Who cares 
if some candidates can't keep up with current spending levels?" 
It's a "natural" question because in nature the weak are 
doomed to die for the good of the group. Fortunately for the 
weaker candidates, only people like economists and biologists 
with very little political clout, and even less charisma, take 
such arguments seriously. 
There may be some real reasons for concern about the 
rising costs of campaigns. Some argue that fund-raising has 
become a full-time job that distracts incumbent candidates 
from their official duties.14 Others argue that the candidates' 
insatiable appetite for cash makes them dangerously dependent 
upon political action committees (PACs) and other big 
~ontributors.'~ Of course, most politicians don't want to buddy 
up to  PACs just for their money-but they don't know how else 
to get it? 
Many, however, are quick to defend current spending 
levels." Some contend that campaign spending promotes 
to hand until it finally disappears,'" Thoughts on the Business of Life, FORBES, Apr. 
1, 1991, at 154 (quoting Robert W. Sarnoff), then maybe the system is working 
just fine and you should quit reading. 
11. Besides, it's not easy creating an image of electability, particularly if the 
candidate is lacking in substantive qualifications. 
12. It seems that political campaigns involve more and more image building 
and less and less substance. See supra note 11. 
13. MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 8, at 28. 
14. See MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 8, at 44-46. I personally don't see any 
cause for concern. There may be good reasons to distract our elected officials from 
their duties. The more they are distracted by spending their own money, the less 
time they will have to spend ours. 
15. Id. at 75-80. 
16. Consider the words of presidential candidate Tom Harkin when asked about 
PAC money: "I take PAC. money, you bet I do, . . . I don't want to fight with 
one hand tied behind my back. In George Bush, we are up against the mother of 
all money machines." Elizabeth Kolbert, Harkin Seeks to Recall Democrats' History, 
Though Some Fear It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1991, at D11. 
17. See generally MAGLEBY & NELSON, supm note 8, at 40-43. These tend to be 
candidates who can, by the way, raise vast sums of money with relative ease. Such 
candidates don't mind the Darwinian approach to  campaign spending-it always 
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participation in the political process by increasing voter 
awareness of critical  issue^.'^ Others actually have the 
audacity to suggest that we really don't spend that much on 
political campaigns. I think Senator Packwood made the point 
very nicely: 
We don't come near spending what we do in this country on 
toothpaste or lipstick or beer or pet food or even advertising 
for pet food. So, in terms of priorities and importance, let us 
not get things out of scale. I would like to think that the 
value of an election for Congress or the Senate is worth as 
much as a can of cat food or dog food[!llg 
Actually, the candidates' desperation for cash really isn't 
their fault. We have given them every incentive t o  behave 
irrationally,20 i.e., spend more on campaigns than they should. 
A simple example of how one might go about auctioning a 
single U.S. dollar for more than it is worth will help illustrate 
the quandary in which candidates find them~elves.~' In the 
dollar auction, two participants bid for a dollar with the 
restriction that both the winner and loser must pay their bids. 
The structure of the auction creates a trap for both players 
when the bidding reaches ninety-nine cents. By bidding one 
cent more, the next bidder would just break even while the 
second bidder would lose ninety-nine cents unless she stays in 
the game. By bidding $1.01, the second bidder can cut her 
losses from ninety-nine cents to one cent. The bidding 
continues in this fashion as each bidder bids more and more in 
an effort to minimize losses. Theoretically, the auction ends 
when one player runs out of money. Campaign dynamics bear a 
strong resemblance to the dollar auction in that all candidates, 
helps to be at the top of the food chain. 
18. Id. at 41-42 (citing 133 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1987) 
(Statement of Sen. Dole)). I wonder, however, if spending increases voter 
participation as much as it increases voter annoyance. 
19. 133 CONG. REC. S7548 (daily ed. June 3, 1987) (Statement of Sen. 
Packwood). Cf. Old Proverb, "Putting your best foot forward at  least keeps it out of 
your mouth." 
20. Astute obsewation suggests that they needed no coaxing in the frrst place. 
21. See Martin Shubik, The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative 
Behavior and Escalation, 15 J .  CONFLICT RESOL. 109-11 (1971). It is a novel idea, 
but one that is not well received among economists. For decades, economists have 
been trying to  convince us that markets behave rationally, and then Shubik comes 
along and gives us good reasons to doubt rational market theories. 
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win or lose, are required to pay their "bids" (campaign 
expenses). Accordingly, we should show a little compassion for 
candidates who find themselves in the middle of a n  
uncontrollable spending frenzy. 
111. ASSESSING VARIOUS CAMPAIGN REFORM PROPOSALS: 
FROM BRAINSTORM TO THE ABSURD 
Given these problems with our campaign finance system, 
should we throw up our hands,22 convinced that nothing can 
be done? Or can we "refine'a3 our elections and avoid the 
expense of all this campaigning? One might first be tempted to 
try a military coup. A military dictatorship would certainly 
eliminate unnecessary campaign expenses, but would have the 
rather extreme effect of eliminating campaigns all together. 
"Not a bad idea," you might say, until you remember that the 
people a t  the Pentagon also have a lousy track record of 
spending.24 
With hopes dashed for a quick military solution, we are left 
to consider other alternatives. Why not try "democracy by 
chance"? For example, each state could hold its own "Seat in 
Congress Lotto." Think about it: each candidate would pay 
$1.00 to play the regular Lotto and could then throw away a n  
extra $1.00 on power play. The beauty of the system is that it 
limits spending to $2.00 per candidate and it's fair because 
each candidate has the same one-zillionth chance of 
winning.25 'Who would run for office in this way?" you query. 
Certainly a lot of people would play the campaign lotto once 
they realized they could win an all-expenses-paid shopping 
spree in the nation's capital for a term of two or six years. 
If you think the two preceding ideas sound silly, consider 
two proposals that have been kicked around Washington lately. 
First, some26 have argued that we should "publicly f inan~e '~ '  
22. Or, just plain "throw up." 
23. Using the word loosely. 
24. Remember, e.g., $435 hammers, $640 toilet seats, etc.; see also Eric Schmitt, 
No $435 Hammers, But Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at A16. 
25. There would be no need to impose term Limitations. What are the odds of 
the same candidate winning two campaign lottos in a row? 
26. Remember the candidates at the bottom of the food chain? You guessed it. 
These are the "some" behind this proposal. 
27. This is congressional code language for "spend tax dollars." 
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all federal campaigns.28 This means that each candidate 
would receive a campaign stipend from the government each 
election year. Sounds great until you consider that Uncle Sam 
is in debt up to the stripes on his hat and really can't spare the 
change. "No! No!'' exclaim the proponents of public funding, the 
money can be raised from an "income tax check that 
would allow individuals to contribute a dollar or two3' to the 
campaign kitty.31 The biggest problem with this idea is that it 
would give our elected officials too much free time to think of 
new ways to spend "public funds."32 
The second reform proposal includes a system of spending 
 limitation^.^' Spending limits offer the most direct solution to 
the dollar auction quandary.34 But consider the hardship that 
spending limits would impose upon the candidates. Once a 
candidate reached his spending quota, he would have to waste 
a lot of extra time and energy trying to figure out alternative 
ways to "spend more" without "spending more rn~ney."'~ I'm 
not suggesting that candidates would do anything illegalP6 
but I am suggesting that politicians are creative people and 
that  we shouldn't discount their resourcefulness. Consider the 
effectiveness of "soft money"" in whittling away individual 
contribution limitations. Though the law limits the amount 
that individuals may contribute to any single candidate, these 
same individuals may make unlimited contributions of "soft 
money" to the candidate's party for activities that indirectly 
benefit the candidate.38 
Spending limits also suffer another minor defect-they're 
28. See generally MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 8, at 153-62. 
29. This is like making a contribution with a gun to  your head. What they are 
saying is, "Since I already have your wallet in hand, how do you feel about 
making a donation?" 
30. Why don't they ask us to send in our old aluminum cans and cereal-box 
tops while we are a t  it? 
31. See generally MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 8, at  158-60. 
32. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
33. See generally MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 8, at 162-75. 
34. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
35. Of course, this might create a nice distraction tying up several hundred 
hours of a politician's time in any given year. See supra note 14 and accompanying 
text. 
36. Far be i t  from me to suggest such an outrageous idea. 
37. "Soft money" is money that has been slobbered on by the dog "under the 
table." 
38. See generally MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 8, at  19 & 166. 
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unconstitutional! In Buckley v. Valeo,sS the Supreme Court 
held that campaign spending is a form of speech protected by 
the First Amendment and cannot be involuntarily limited.40 
Now you know why "talk is cheap" unless politicians are the 
people doing it. 
Actually, public financiers and spending limitators [sicI4' 
each make some valid points in favor of their respective 
proposals. But both groups have been unable to convince 
enough people that their ideas hold water.42 What we really 
need is a political hero who can come to the rescue and propose 
a compromise, a win-win solution. Since people like Madison 
and Washington are no longer with who could do a 
better job than our childhood hero, Robin Hood?44 After all, 
Robin Hood stands for everything we hold sacred today in  
American politics-you know-"Take from the rich and give to 
the poor!" 
Let's take a closer look at what this compromise might 
entail. Our dollar auction example aptly demonstrated that we 
shouldn't expect candidates to voluntarily limit their own 
spending impulses. They need some external help.45 Outright 
spending limitations also have some minor drawbacks and are 
probably not the best way to go about controlling campaign 
spending. The answer may lie in a system of negative 
39. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59. 
41. This is a short-hand way of saying, "I meant to do that." 
42. A similar drawback is that these ideas really don't hold water. 
43. This is not to say that we shouldn't look for modern day Madisons and 
Washingtons. However, as Stanley Cloud suggests, we may not want to waste our 
time wandering the halls of Congress: "[Olnly a fool would expect 535 individual 
politicians to coalesce into a body capable of national leadership. That is, after all, 
what Presidents are for." Stanley W. Cloud, Bums of the Year, TIME, Jan. 6, 1992, 
at 48. 
44. I bring Robin Hood into this Comment ignoring the fad that nobody can 
agree upon whether he was real or fiction and further ignoring the fact that if he 
was real, he would have been a foreigner. But hey, if the Framers could look 
admiringly to foreigners like Locke, Montesquieu, and Hobbes, why shouldn't we at 
least give a guy like Robin Hood a few paragraphs in a student comment included 
in a Humor & the Law symposium? 
45. A€ter all, these are the same people responsible for thousands of broken 
campaign promises. 
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incentives that induce candidates to voluntarily limit their 
campaign spending sprees. The next few paragraphs get a little 
confusing, but, if you have ever successfully completed your 
own Form 1040 before the April 15 deadline, you really 
shouldn't have any diff i~ulty.~~ 
Figure 1 is a drawing of a typical candidate47 in graphic 
form.48 The graph represents the candidate's budget 
constraint4' that plots campaign receipts on the vertical axis 
and time on the horizontal axis. 
Campaign 
Receipts I 
A C B Time 
Other Activities Fund Raising 
0 - - 0 
Figure 1. The Candidate's Budget Constraint. 
46. Some of you might be saying, "I don't do my own taxes. I have my 
accountant do them for me." If so, you should have your accountant read the next 
few paragraphs. 
47. Notice the resemblance? 
48. Whatever you do, don't be impressed with graphs. Graphs are merely 
evidence of the slow evolution of economic literature. They are the functional 
equivalent of Neanderthal pictographs drawn on cave walls. 
49. Despite the fad that once these people get eleded they spend "public 
funds" as if' there were no such thing as budget constraints, garden variety 
candidates really are like you and me in that they have a tough time spending 
more than their budget allows. 
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Time is considered a fixed resource; therefore, line segment 
AB represents the total amount of time available to the 
candidate for all activities. Figure 1 assumes that candidates 
trade time for campaign  receipt^.^' Thus, at point B, the 
candidate has spent no time fund-raising and her campaign 
receipts equal zero. At point C, the candidate has spent time in 
the amount of CB fund-raising, leaving time in the amount of 
AC for all other acti~ities.~' At point C, the candidate has 
campaign receipts in the amount of R,. Now, how can we tell 
exactly how much time the candidate will spend fund-raising? 
The answer to that question depends on the candidate's own 
set of preferences. 
Campaign 
Receipts I 
0 1 2 
Other Activities 
Time 
Fund Raising 
Figure 2. The Candidate's Indifference Curves. 
50. Never mind the fact that, in the past, some candidates have actually been 
willing to trade political favors for campaign contributions. This is an economic 
argument, and I am, therefore, allowed to ignore reality to make my point. 
51. This graph is a bit tricky to read. The difficulty lies in the fact that to 
determine how much time the candidate devotes to fund raising, you must read 
the horizontal axis from right to left. To determine how much time the candidate 
devotes to all activities excluding fund raising, you must read the horizontal axis 
from left to right. If this explanation hasn't helped, try reading the graph while 
relaxing in a soothing bubble bath. That way, if you never do catch on to the 
graph, youll at least have one thing to thank me for. 
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Figure 2 represents the candidate's trade-off between 
campaign receipts and other activities. The curved lines labeled 
I, and I, are called "indifference curves."62 The curves 
represent constant levels of satisfaction. In other words, as far 
as the candidate is concerned, any point on a given curve is 
just as desirable as another point along that same curve. The 
levels of satisfaction increase in a "north easterly" direction on 
the graph. 
In Figure 2, the candidate maximizes her fund-raising 
satisfactions3 at point A where I, is tangent to her budget 
constraint. At point A, the candidate spends time fund-raising 
in an amount represented by the distance from T,* to T3, and 
receives campaign contributions in the amount of R*. At any 
other level of fund-raising, the candidate would fall on a lower 
indifference curve-a less desirable result. For example, at 
point B, the candidate receives greater contributions, %, but 
has less time to  devote to other activities like recovering from 
the lead-weight pancakes she consumed at early morning fund- 
raising breakfasts. 
52. There is really nothing sacred about the name "indifference curve." The 
name probably owes its origin to the fact that economists are people who generally 
lack a great deal of personality and creativity and who in a fit of rational boredom 
settled upon the name "indifference." 
53. This is not to say that she maximizes her fund-raising income. "Income" 
and 'satisfaction from income" are really two different things. Congress' recent 
salary increase is a good example of how little satisfaction politicians derive fmm 
any income less than $125,000. 
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Campaign 
Receipts 
R 
Tax 
Amount 
Other Activities 
Time 
Fund Raising 
Figure 3. The Effect of a Negative Incentive Tax. 
Figure 3 depicts what happens to our candidate's fund- 
raising activities when she is subjected t o  a negative 
incentive-a tax on gross campaign receipts. The tax creates a 
new budget constraint represented by the dotted line lying just 
below the solid budget constraint. The shift in the budget 
constraint compels the candidate to operate on a lower 
indifference curve. Notice that campaign receipts fall from Ro to  
R, and fund-raising time decreases from To t o  TI. The 
advantage of the negative incentive tax is that it is not an 
absolute ceiling on spending and does not require a political 
determination of how much total spending is too much.s4 
Instead, campaign fund-raising activities and spending are 
54. This prevents pitting more perfectly evolved candidates at the top of the 
food chain directly against weaker candidates at the bottom of the chain when 
trying to decide exactly where a given spending limit should be drawn. 
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voluntarily curtailed when subjected to the negative 
incentive.55 
'Well enough," say the spending limitators, "the idea at 
least partially satisfies our desire to cap spending." But now we 
hear the public financiers ask, 'What's in the proposal for us?" 
Actually there is something in the proposal that might help the 
public financiers get a little extra sleep at night. Look at 
Figure 3 again.56 Remarkably, the negative incentive tax has 
extracted a net revenue from our beleaguered candidate of R, - 
&. If you are a public financier, you are now probably starting 
to wake up from the slumber induced by the preceding 
paragraphs. Reaching for your calculator, you start to 
wonder:7 ' m a t  if that $718 million spent by individual 
candidates in the 1988 federal campaign had been subject to a 
15 percent tax?" Happily, you discover that the 1988 campaign 
would have generated revenues in excess of $107 million. 
Remembering that generating revenues is only half the fun, we 
ask, "What should we do with all that money?" Returning to 
the gospel of modern American politics and drawing upon the 
lessons from Nottingham, we realize that the $107 million was 
taken from none other than "rich candidates." So why not take 
that pot of gold and give it to "poor  candidate^?"^^ "Hooray!" 
55. On a more serious note, the negative incentive could be enhanced by a 
graduated rate of taxation that would result in greater campaign receipts being 
subject to increasing rates of taxation. In such an environment, large contributors 
would probably alter their own donation strategies. If a contributor knew that its 
target candidate was nearing a greater tax bracket, it would realize that a 
substantial portion of its donation would not end up in the candidate's pocket. To 
avoid diluting its contribution, the contributor could be expected to spread its 
wealth among several candidates who have not yet reached top level tax brackets. 
56. "Agony!" you cry out when you fmally realize that I am asking you to look 
at Figure 3 "again." I apologize. I realize that one look at a graph is about all any 
self-respecting non-economist can stomach, but if you will bear with me, I promise 
that there will only be one more graph to look at after this. 
57. Don't bother reaching for your calculator, I'll do the math for you. Rest 
assured. You can trust my calculations. ARer all, I am a product of public 
education. 
58. Of course, somebody will still need to decide who the "poor candidates" are. 
The decision could be avoided, however, by one of two means. First, treat 
everybody the same. You heard me. This is America and we at least have to give 
lip service to equality. Thus, the revenues would be divided equally among all 
nominees; part of the amount paid to the big fund raisers will return in the form 
of the negative incentive tax. Second, if you are still clinging to the law of the 
jungle argument made earlier in this Comment, don't give the money to anybody 
and let the little candidates fall by the wayside. Instead, use the money for some 
silly thing like paying off the national debt. 
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exclaim the public financiers as they realize that they will now 
be entitled to  a substantial election year windfall. 
Campaign 
Receipts 
R 
T T 
0 1 
Other Activities 
0- 
Time 
Fund Raising 
0 
Figure 4. Effect of an Assistance Payment to the Candidate. 
Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of a common fund 
assistance payment to a single needy candidate. The amount of 
the assistance payment is represented by the horizontal line 
EC and insures the candidate a minimum budget in the 
amount of R'. The candidate's original budget constraint AB is 
now modified by the lump sum payment and is represented by 
the line ACB. Before the lump sum payment, the candidate 
spent To time fund-raising and received contributions in the 
amount of %. ARer the payment, the candidate spends time in 
the amount of T, devoted to fund-raising but now has total 
contributions R, at her disposal to compete with more perfectly 
evolved candidates up the food chain. 
Well, perhaps this Comment hasn't discussed all of the 
506 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
intricacies of campaign f inan~e.~ '  But, a t  least it has 
attempted to present a workable compromise between the 
public financiers and the spending limitators. The negative 
incentive based campaign finance proposal tries to satisfy the 
spending limitator's impulse to curb run away-campaign costs 
and correct the dollar auction problem of the current system. 
The proposal also attempts to give the public financiers a little 
working capital with which to work their social justice and help 
out feeble candidates. 
If you are a spending limitator and happen to share an 
office with a public financier, this Comment will hopefully give 
you both some common ground upon which to build a 
somewhat civil relationship. But before you both go in together 
on that houseboat time-share, don't forget about the more 
perfectly evolved candidates on the other end of the food chain. 
They are likely to impede your budding relationship because 
they neither need nor want real reform. Be patient. Their time 
will come. For, as our hero Robin Hood said, "'He who is fat 
from overliving must needs lose blood.' '"O 
York Moody Faulkner 
59. To do so would require an entire book. Besides, the publishing companies I 
know of aren't likely to give a third year law student a cash advance to write a 
voluminous exposition on a bunch of theoretical hogwash. That's what professors 
are for. 
60. PYLE, supra note 1, at 101 (Robin Hood quoting Gaffer Swanthold). 
